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One topic that regularly recurs in the scholarship on modern warfare is combat cohesion 
and motivation.  Many volumes have been published on these topics, and there is no sign that 
this interest might abate any time soon.  That interest has only rarely filtered down to scholarship 
of the ancient and late antique worlds, however. 1  The sixth century is well suited to analyses of 
these issues given the abundance of varied and high quality evidence, despite the lack of 
attention given the subject by modern scholars.  This chapter seeks to remedy this by offering an 
introduction to combat cohesion and motivation in the sixth century. It forms the second half of a 
two-part project on the subject, and the core this project is the evidence of Procopius.2   
Procopius describes more than thirty battles or sieges from the age of Justinian,3 and his battle 
narratives have been the subject of a good deal of research.4  Yet there is much more work to do 
on sixth-century combat and our understanding Procopius’ value as a source for military history.  
By introducing the subject of combat cohesion and motivation in the sixth century, this paper 
seeks to move the discussion forward.5   
The first part of this paper will be concerned with motivation, and will explore the much 
discussed “ratio of fire” and its applicability in an ancient context, the presumed bellicosity of 
some soldiers that many of our sources hint at, and the role of fear in motivating soldiers to fight 
and to maintain their cohesion.  Indeed, fear serves as the segue to combat cohesion, and here the 
discussion picks up where the first paper left off.6  There are two forms of cohesion that will 
form the basis of this analysis:  horizontal cohesion, the cohesion generated by the relationship 
between peers in the military, and after providing an overview of unit cohesion we turn to 
regimental pride and unit standards; and vertical cohesion, which is the cohesion involving 
leaders and their subordinates, which will include the subjects of training and the wider role of 
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the commander.  Procopius’ Wars is an integral component of any examination of sixth-century 
combat, and as such will form the core of this analysis.  The aim, however, is a holistic approach 
to cohesion and motivation, so Procopius’ accounts will be supplemented by other sixth-century 
sources of evidence including the accounts of Syrianus and Maurice, the incidental details found 
in the works of historians like Agathias and Theophylact Simocatta, the legal evidence, and the 
physical evidence.   
 
I.  Combat Motivation 
Ratio of Fire  
A much discussed factor in combat motivation, and to a lesser extent unit cohesion, is 
“ratio of fire”, which refers to the proportion of combatants who use their weapons.  Scholars 
have questioned how many men fired their weapons in the heat of battle, and the impetus for this 
is the influential work of S. L. A. Marshall.7  Marshall, based on a wealth of interviews that he 
conducted with US troops during Wold War II, argued that only one in five US soldiers actually 
fired their weapons, a low number which increased slightly due to training improvements by the 
time of the Korean and later Vietnam wars.  As an aside, Marshall was also one of the first 
scholars to put a great deal of emphasis on unit cohesion, another being the nineteenth century 
French officer Ardant du Picq.8  Getting back to ratio of fire, this notion that western men were 
generally averse to using their weapons in the throes of combat has been picked up more recently 
by Grossman, a former lieutenant colonel, who has written two influential books.9  Following 
Marshall, Grossman too argued that only a few men used their weapons in combat.  If this was a 
universal tendency, an aversion to killing, then sixth-century soldiers would need a great deal of 
motivating indeed.   
Adrian Goldsworthy, who wrote a pivotal study of battle in republican and imperial 
Rome, suggested that only one quarter of Roman soldiers might have actively tried to kill their 
opponents, a nuanced take on Marshall’s claims.  Of course, evidence for how often soldiers 
used their weapons in ancient in combat is hard, if not well nigh impossible, to come by.  
Ancient historians, arguably our most detailed sources for ancient battles, display little interest in 
the feats of the ordinary soldier, exceptional circumstances aside, as per the conventions of their 
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chosen genre.  Is there another way to determine, or at least guess at, the kill rates in sixth-
century combat?   
One possible solution is to look closely at the numbers reported in ancient battles and to 
work out the average number of casualties per man.  Many historians give us the number of 
participants in a battle, as well as the number of casualties, and in many instances the numbers 
that historians report are fairly reliable, with Procopius a particularly notable example.10  In the 
Battle of Dara, for instance, Procopius gives the following figures for the two armies:  25,000 for 
the Romans (1.13.23), and 40,000 for the Persians (1.13.23).  By the end of the battle, we learn 
that the Persians had suffered about 5,000 casualties (1.14.51), though Procopius does not tell us 
the number of Roman casualties.  Using those numbers, and assuming they are accurate, if no 
one killed more than one man then the Romans needed only one fifth of their force to try and 
succeed in killing a Persian opponent.  Procopius does not tell us how many men were wounded, 
however.  And such a practice would then suggest that only the smallest of fractions of Persian 
men would have made an attempt to kill Romans, and succeeded, which would make the 
Persians soft indeed, and so support many of the Persian stereotypes we find in the sources.11  
What is more, all of this ignores any attempts on either side not to get killed.  In other words, it 
seems unlikely that those who perished just stood there while their foes hacked away, but rather 
they are likely to have ducked, dodged, blocked, parried and more.12  Furthermore, in other 
instances, presumably involving many of the same groups of men, the results were quite different 
– either the men suddenly found some hidden courage, or the opposite.  A more systematic 
approach than this preliminary one might yield better results, but it seems more than likely that it 
would not.  As noted, deducing ratio of fire on the basis of sixth-century evidence would seem 
near impossible. 
As it happens, more recent scholarship has revealed the weaknesses of Marshall’s 
findings, especially with respect to ratio of fire.13  In a study on the combat effectiveness of 
Canadian soldiers in World War II, Engen was able to draw on a number of still accessible – 
unlike Marshall’s – reports compiled after combat that dealt specifically with the degree to which 
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soldiers used their weapons.14  Engen reveals that Canadian soldiers did not have the same 
hesitation in using their weapons that Marshall alleges the Americans had.  Indeed, Engen’s 
forceful rebuttal casts doubt on whether ratio of fire is even applicable to militaries, modern and 
ancient.15  Unless we decide that Canadian soldiers are unique in their propensity to fire at the 
enemy, ratio of fire is not an established means of determining combat motivation, let alone 
effectiveness. 
 
Bellicose Soldiers  
We cannot determine the ratio of fire for the sixth century based on the available 
evidence for combat.  What we do occasionally find, however, is reference to particularly 
bellicose soldiers, those who might have been more willing to kill in battle.  Procopius rarely 
discusses the bellicosity of individual soldiers, except for a few remarks on the quality of 
Belisarius’ personal retinue.16  Indeed, Procopius is loath to highlight individual soldiers, 
especially those of the rank-and-file, unless they perform remarkable deeds.17  Many of our 
additional textual sources for the sixth century do, however.   
Syrianus Magister wrote the Peri Strategias and some additional texts perhaps as early as 
the sixth century.18  Syrianus spent a good part of his time in that work discussing the phalanx, 
seemingly an ancient formation, but one with some current applicability.  His discussion 
eventually turns to whom should stand where, and he makes the following salient points:   
The front rank men…squad leaders, should stand out from the rest of the army because of 
their courage and physical strength, for they have to bear the brunt of the hand-to-hand 
fighting and wear such heavy armour. The other major officers should be no less 
distinguished for courage and physical strength. They should also be far superior to the 
others in combat experience and good sense, each one according to his rank and the number 
of troops under his command… 




 See, too, Janniard’s comments (2011, 403). 
16
 Procopius (7.1.20) claims that the 7,000 horsemen that Belisarius recruited using his own resources would shy 
away from standing at the front of a battle line, or challenging men to single combat. 
17
 See Whately 2016a:  31-34. 
18
 Admittedly, scholarly opinion seems to be leaning towards a ninth century date largely on the basis of the 
excellent points made by Rance (2007).  To my mind, however, Syrianus’ mention of Belisarius (idem, 709-711) 
and his terminology for Arabs (idem, 711-714) leave the possibility for a sixth century date open. 
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The rear guard should possess no less courage and physical strength than the men stationed 
in the second rank. They should also be notably superior to other troops in experience and 
good sense, for they are responsible for forming and keeping the men in their place in line. In 
action, moreover, they must keep the men ahead of them in close order, so that the phalanx 
may maintain its compact formation and present a stronger and more formidable front to the 
enemy…Fifth in importance are the leaders of half files, who help in maintaining order in the 
files and who keep the men in front of them in closer order, just as the rear guard who, by 
themselves, cannot tighten up the ranks of the whole phalanx.19 
 
In the passage Syrianus, like other ancient writers, sees value in cohesion, not surprising in a 
discussion of the phalanx, but like the others he is interested in cohesion of the larger whole.  
While the functioning of the larger whole may be contingent on the workings of several smaller 
groups, on the surface, at least, that is not immediately apparent.  As we have seen, we do not 
have much in the way of direct evidence for these small groups, numbering 6-10 men, in our 
sources, or at least for permanent groupings of that size at this time.  Vegetius’ contubernia have 
more to do with his vague antiqua legio than contemporary practice, and Maurice’s small groups 
might be ad hoc structures organized for combat – contingent on circumstances, then, and not a 
regular formation.  Furthermore, in Syrianus’ eyes, cohesion of the group has more to do with 
the efforts of the various officers and commanders in the ranks, as well as the experience and 
bravery of the men at the front, rear, and flanks of the line, than anything else, a point to which 
we will return below. 
In his detailed and comprehensive account of the mechanics of sixth-century cavalry, and 
to a lesser extent infantry, combat, Maurice regularly identifies a group of soldiers whom he 
labels koursores (κούρσορες).  Dennis translated the term as “assault troops”,20 and Maurice 
claims these are the troops who move out from the main line to attack a retreating foe.21  That 
very definition implies that the koursores were more willing to engage their foes than not, 
especially given the dangers inherent in attacking a fleeing opponent.  The term is used 
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throughout the text, and we even find it in select papyri including one from Nessana.22  In the 
case of the latter, however, the term refers to something else, probably couriers, rather than 
mobile front-line attackers.23  The term is used dozens of times in the Strategikon as assault 
troops, however.24  When Maurice turns to the structure of his armies, he makes it clear that the 
koursores are to be positioned at the front in ordinary battles, in other words not just deployed at 
the end during the pursuit.25  The implication is that they should, ideally, be able to meet the 
enemy in battle themselves, and that if they are pushed back for whatever reason, they will return 
to combat and fight at the front as soon as they have had a chance to regroup.  By and large, 
Maurice seems to imply that some soldiers would be more willing to fight than others, and that 
they should be given every opportunity to do so.   
One anonymous author, Agathias, and Theophylact Simocatta recognize that some 
soldiers were more warlike than others, so seeming to support the view of Syrianus and Maurice 
that some men were more warlike and so better at maintaining cohesion.  The anonymous author 
of the Dialogue of Political Science, though not, at least based on the surviving evidence, a 
classicizing historian, also implies that some men will be more likely to keep their position in 
line than others.26  Agathias, for instance, refers to an incident in which Stephanus, a 
commander, collected two hundred of the bravest and best-armed cavalry for an expedition 
(1.17.4).  In another example, Theophylact emphasizes the bellicosity of some soldiers in his 
description of the Siege of Constantina.  In that account the general Romanus manages to 
separate the brave from the weak, and apparently selects the most warlike (τὸ μὲν μάχιμον), 
though Theophylact does not get into what this might have entailed.27  A book earlier, while 
discussing Heraclius, father of the emperor Heraclius, Theophylact notes that Commentiolus 
marched to Anchialus, and that when he got there he reviewed his troops to separate the brave 
from the ineffectual.28  Thus, while we do not have evidence for sixth-century ratio of fire rates, 
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there is some evidence that our sources believed that some soldiers were more motivation in 
combat than others.   
 
Fear and the Law 
One point where the line between motivation and cohesion blurs is when it comes to fear, 
for fear can both motivate soldiers to fight and to stay together in the line.29 Procopius, like his 
successors Agathias and Theophylact Simocatta, addresses fear a few times.  All three historians 
reveal some insight into the psychology of soldiers; sometimes it is the fear of Roman soldiers in 
battle, and sometimes it is the fear of Rome’s foes.30  A few examples will suffice.  
Starting with Procopius, elements of the Roman army were scared when they discovered 
their enemy’s position at the Battle of Callinicum (1.18.9), while we find the Romans trying to 
frighten their foes by means of stratagems in the Battle of Satala (1.15.12).  The Romans employ 
similar techniques in Africa at the Battle of Mt. Bourgaon (4.12.12-22) and in the build-up to the 
Battle of Tricamarum (4.1.8).  Exhortations too often contained references to fear.  In his speech 
to the Vandals before the Battle of Tricamarum, Gelimer attempts to persuade his men to use 
fear to guide them to victory (4.2.13).31  Agathias, as narrator, comments on the employment of 
similar tactics in his account of the Siege of Cumae.  There select Roman and allied commanders 
were to scare the Goths away from an encampment set up on the River Po (1.11.4).  Sometimes 
fear might even impel a general to abandon or postpone plans for battle even if his troops were 
eager, as was the case with the general Romanus when faced with an overwhelming number of 
Persians at Constantina,32 and Belisarius decades earlier at Callinicum.33 
We do not find fear only in the literary sources, however, for there are indirect references 
to it in the legal evidence too.  There are a number of pieces of legislation from the Digest that 
pertain specifically to combat:  49.3.13 indicates that soldiers who lose their weapons in wartime 
(in bello) should suffer capital punishment.  A couple of lines later we find this:  “a man who has 
fallen out of line is normally either beaten with rods or changes his branch of service according 
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to the circumstances”.34  At the same time, we read that the soldier who first flees from the battle 
line faces capital punishment, and with his fellow soldiers looking on, no less.35  While these 
three instructions come from the works of jurists written some three hundred or so years earlier, 
their inclusion by the compilers of the Digest shows their sixth-century relevance.36  The Digest 
is not the only sixth-century work that argues that soldiers be punished in these circumstances, 
for Maurice says as much in the Strategikon.37  Indeed, although the Justinianic Code and the 
subsequent Novels do not delve into combat in particular, there is legislation concerning the 
possession of arms that indicates imperial authorities held it to be a serious matter.38  Ownership 
of weapons was to be controlled, if at all possible. 
Fear, then, would seem to have been a significant motivating force, and in certain 
contexts it might have enabled greater cohesion in battle.  On the other hand, it could be used to 
achieve the opposite effect.  In some instances fear would motivate soldiers to abandon their line 
and flee, rather than to stay together.  Although we questioned the validity of Marshall’s ratio of 
fire above, these ancient accounts of fleeing from battle would seem to indicate that some of the 
same psychological factors motivated sixth-century soldiers as their more recent counterparts. 
 
II.  Combat Cohesion 
Bands of Brothers 
As noted above, this chapter effectively serves as the second of two parts.  The first part, 
from a collection on unit cohesion in ancient warfare, examined the evidence for unit cohesion in 
sixth-century combat.39  What that study revealed is that we have very little evidence for units of 
the size required, eight to ten men, to determine whether unit cohesion, or horizontal peer 
bonding, is a factor in combat.40  Procopius does not describe such small units, and the military 
manuals, for the most part, limit their discussions to short-term divisions.41  The only possible 
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reference to an eight- to ten-man unit in operation comes from a lone papyrus from Nessana, P. 
Ness. 3.37, which refers to allocations of men by dekarch, the presumptive leader of a 
dekarchy,42 dispatched for an unknown operation in Egypt.  Although we should not dismiss it 
outright, we best explain combat cohesion motivation using alternative means.43   
 
Regimental Pride  
One of the factors that Engen raises in his account of combat motivation in the Canadian 
army is regimental pride.44  Not surprisingly, our evidence for sixth-century regiments is sparse, 
not only in comparison to the World War II material, but also in comparison to early and high 
Rome imperial era material.45  Procopius’ language for regiments is vague, and the legal, 
papyrological, and epigraphic evidence is incomplete.46  Jones discusses the identifiable sixth-
century regiments.47  Jones’ list, however, is compiled using a wide range of sources, and often 
our only evidence comes from a lone mention in a text, or a chance inscription.   
One such example comes from Theophylact Simocatta who, unlike Procopius, 
occasionally employs technical military terminology.48  And unlike Procopius, he identifies one 
of the military units that features in his narrative; Theophylact calls the soldiers stationed in 
Beroia in Syria the Quartoparthoi (τοῦ καταλόγου γεγονέναι τῶν Κουαρτοπάρθων), in other 
words the legio IV Parthia, a legion whose history stretched back several hundred years.49  That 
one passage, however, is the only place where he names the regiment.  As it happens, our 
comparative evidence is not any better:  there is no record of such a unit in any published Latin 
or Greek inscription, the most likely type of evidence to corroborate Theophylact.  The Notitia 
Dignitatum records Equites quarti clibanarii Parthi serving under the magister militum per 
Orientem.50 The document also records a legio IV Parthia based in Circesium under the dux 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Strat. 12.9.1.4) and Hesychius (Ε 6178), as well as the works of some earlier authors like Aelian (Tact. 5.2.3) and 
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 Not. Dign. Or. 7.8. 
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Osrhoenae.51  Of those two, the latter is the unit most likely to be identified with 
Theophylact’s.52  Theophylact names Circesium on a number of occasions in his History,53 and 
at no point does he imply that the city had a military garrison. When the unit would have been 
transferred from Circesium to Beroia is unclear, though Theophylact’s statement implies that it 
would have been well before he was writing in the early seventh century.  Procopius, writing 
several decades earlier, mentions some of the construction work implemented by Justinian at 
Circesium in his Buildings.54  Significantly for our purposes, in addition to the building works, 
Procopius says he stationed some troops (στρατιωτικῶν δὲ καταλόγων) under the command 
of a duke (δοῦκα καλοῦσι).55  Given the Notitia Dignitatum, dated to the beginning of the fifth 
century, still had the IV Parthia based at Circesium ultimately under the command of a duke (of 
Osrhoenae), and since we have no reason to doubt Procopius’ claims about Circesium’ 
dilapidated state, it seems likely the legion was transferred to Beroia later in the fifth century.56  
Still, identifying, Theophylact’s unit with one in the Notitia Dignitatum gets us no closer to 
establishing anything of the regiment’s character, and this for a unit that would seem to be better 
documented than most.  As noted above, there is no epigraphic record for the legion, nor have 
Circesium or Beroia (modern Aleppo) received any sustained archaeological investigation, so we 
have no material record of a Roman military presence.   
Theophylact’s account does provide some additional evidence, however.  The episode in 
question does not take place at Beroia, but rather in the environs of Dara, some distance away, 
and involves the travails of an unnamed Roman soldier recovered by the elder Heraclius’ scouts 
on a reconnaissance mission.57  He is gravely wounded:  Theophylact claims the dying soldier 
had been wounded four times using arrows, a spear, and a javelin.58  This soldier, compared to 
Alexander the Great, Leonidas, and Callimachus (the Athenian commander at Marathon),59 is 
given a death scene worthy of a Hollywood blockbuster, and as is befitting a heroic individual.  
It is after his death that Theophylact alludes to the reports that the man was from the Beroian 
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regiment.  Given that Theophylact specifically calls him a hero when he names the unit, it could 
be that his fellow soldiers in the IV Parthia were well known for their military prowess.  Indeed, 
several pages later Theophylact narrates a comparable heroic scene, in which the individual in 
question is named, but his regiment is not.60  On the other hand, the naming of the unit seems 
incidental, and might better reflect Theophylact’s source rather than the legion’s particular 
aptitude for combat.  If anything, the evidence is circumstantial.  Assuming we take Theophylact 
at his word, someone might have made a note of the man’s regiment, and it seems reasonable to 
suppose that his bravery would have been a source of pride to his comrades.61   Given we have 
no other evidence for soldiers from Beroia, we will never know. 
The truth is, just as in the modern era, regiments would regularly need replenishment, 
particularly during long and drawn out campaigns.62  Engen put great stock in casualties too – 
while we have some good data about casualties in Procopian combat, Procopius deploys figures 
unevenly, and usually at the end of his accounts, which does not allow much time or space for 
him to reveal their impact on the motivation and morale of sixth-century soldiers.  It is worth 
pointing out too that in many cases Procopius puts most of his emphasis on the casualties 
suffered by Rome’s foes, like the Persians.  Whitby has suggested that the Justinianic army, if 
150,000 strong, needed about 6,000 soldiers a year.63  Recruitment might have been far more 
difficult when the plague struck64 whether it was an issue beforehand or not,65 though we do not 
yet know the scale of its impact on the military.66  We also do not even know the proportion of 
soldiers who served fulltime and the proportion of those recruited on a more ad hoc basis, as 
seems to have been the case for some sixth-century campaigns.  While Procopius makes it clear 
that in some regions, like the eastern frontier, troops were readily available,67 for some 
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campaigns recruitment seems to have been carried out as needed,68 and this was no less true 
when Theophylact was writing,69 which suggests it was a regular occurrence.  If soldiers on 
campaign were in many instances most likely to be involved in large scale combat, and they, in 
turn, were recruited on ad hoc basis, there would have been little opportunity for regimental 
pride to development.  We need to look elsewhere for combat cohesion and motivation.  
 
Unit Standards 
One further place where we might find evidence of motivation and cohesion comes from 
our evidence for unit standards, often called banda (singular bandon) at the end of antiquity.70  
Unit standards remained an important part of warfare at the end of antiquity and beyond.71  
Maurice discusses the unit and the standard regularly in the Strategikon.  The bandon as standard 
could take many forms, and there were recognizable colours and streamers for an individual 
tagma, a unit about 300 strong, roughly the same size as the bandon the unit, a moira, a unit 
1,000 to 2,000 strong, the approximate size of the late antique legion,72 and a meros, a unit 6,000 
to 7,000 men strong.73  These standards served as symbols for divisions within a larger army, and 
were used not only to communicate tactical manoeuvres to those divisions, but also so that 
soldiers knew where to stand and move in battle.74  Although Maurice never says so explicitly, 
that different divisions were to have their own standard and soldiers were positioned behind 
these on the march suggests that standards might, potentially, have functioned as a source of 
pride for the soldiers in any of these divisions.   
Besides these select examples, we also have some physical evidence of their continued 
importance.  At the fort of el-Lejjūn in Jordan, there is strong evidence that the shrine to the 
standard remained in use until soldiers ceased to occupy the site in the middle of the sixth 
century; moreover, it seems there was an active attempt to restore the shrine when the fort 
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suffered significant damage at the start of the sixth century.75  What the remains from el-Lejjūn 
do not tell us is which standards might have been housed in the fort:  that for the local garrison 
alone, which seems to have been a legion,76 or smaller divisions as well?  Nevertheless, el-Lejjūn 
was not the only site in late antiquity where we have physical evidence for the importance of 
standards in late antiquity, for we find additional evidence in Britain, Moesia Inferior, and 
Egypt.77   
In fact, although the evidence is only circumstantial, references to standards in combat 
demonstrate their significance.  Standards appear occasionally in Procopius’ Wars, and they 
serve an important role in battle.  If it falls or is captured the standard’s rightful owners tend to 
despair, as the Persians do at the Battle of Dara.78  At the Battle of Satala, which also takes place 
in the east, the Romans charge the Persians and the standard of their general in particular 
(1.15.15), a move which brings disorder and fear to the Persians (1.15.16).  On the one hand, in 
this example from Satala, the charge of the group with the standard startles the Persians and 
lessens their motivation to keep fighting; on the other hand, the standard’s capture serves as a 
motivating factor for the Romans.  While we may not have direct evidence for a connection 
between standards and regimental pride, there is no reason to doubt that the standard played an 
important role in combat, and possibly both in motivation and cohesion. 
 
Training 
One other means of instilling the value of cohesion in a soldier was to train him well, a 
point not lost on scholars of modern militaries or ancient historians themselves.  In his critique of 
the impact of unit cohesion, for instance, King,79 whose focus was the British Army, emphasized 
the role of collective drill, while not necessarily downplaying the small groups.80  In his detailed 
and comprehensive analysis of the mechanics of late antique combat, Janniard devotes 
considerable attention to the training required,81 at all levels, to effect complicated tactical 
                                                      
75
 Lain and Parker 2006, 156. 
76
 Whately 2015b, 15. 
77
 Lain and Parker 2006. 
78
 1.14.50-52.  See too Shean 2010, 44-54; Whately 2016a, 98. 
79
 King 2006, 510. 
80
 cf. Siebold 2006, 293. 
81
 Janniard 2011, 177-183.  See too his comments in the discussion of the depth of the battle line from the fourth to 
sixth centuries (idem, 217-228). 
 14
manoeuvering, and he notes that the manuals in particular put great stock in this training.82  
Indeed, amongst ancient historians and writers, three of our most important sources, Polybius, 
Josephus, and Vegetius, who each cover a different period in Roman military history, highlight 
the impressive Roman training regimen.83  Polybius and Josephus wrote well before the period 
under review here.  Vegetius, who was not as far removed from the sixth century world, seems to 
anticipate the arguments of King, for one way to read his text is as a sustained argument in 
favour of the importance of training.  Such a reading might make sense of the popularity of 
Vegetius’ text in the Late Middle Ages and into the Renaissance.  Indeed, to the surprise of many 
a Classicist, in terms of numbers of later copies of manuscripts, Vegetius’ Epitoma Rei Militaris 
was the most popular text from the classical world.84  If medieval and renaissance readers 
understood the Epitoma Rei Militaris as military-training text, perhaps we should too.  Other late 
antique, even sixth-century, authors emphasized the importance of training, and those authors 
often argued that the individual who had the greatest responsibility in military training was the 
general, even the emperor.  The debate between Menas and Thomas in the Dialogue on Political 
Science on military matters in book four delves into the importance of training.85  In fact, a 
common topos found in ancient historiography was of the commander who restored the 
discipline of lazy troops by means of his rigidity and training prowess.86  It is no surprise, then, 
to find Agathias referring to just this when he notes at the start of book two that Narses spent the 
beginning of spring in 554 engaging his troops in combat training.87  Theophylact too records the 
general Justinian’s efforts to improve the training of the troops under his command.88 
Though modern scholars, like Engen, have downplayed the significance of training in 
combat motivation and cohesion,89 it remained an important component of the larger whole.  
Indeed, it suffices to say that for many an ancient Roman training was essential.  Whether they 
were specifically interested in combat cohesion or not, the fact that they were interested in what 
made the Romans so successful in war presupposes an interest in cohesion, indirect or otherwise.   
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The Role of the Commander  
The last factor to discuss is the commander, for we have plenty of evidence of vertical 
cohesion, the bonding between leaders and subordinates, from the sixth century.  The great man 
was for most of antiquity, classical or late, a prime force in historical change, and the classicizing 
historians in particular, upon whom so much of our knowledge of late antique military history 
depends, were particularly keen on the role of the individual in war.90  Procopius’ Wars is 
particularly notable in this regard,91 though this is, perhaps, only a little less true of the histories 
of Agathias and Theophylact.92  This stress on the great man and the individual was dictated by 
ancient theorists, some of whom argued that you should only include commanders and generals 
in descriptions of combat.93  But there is reason to think that commanders served as more than a 
literary device, for there are many places where we find not just the action centred on the 
commanders, but the commanders in the thick of the action, fighting alongside their fellow-
soldiers.94  In that long passage from his Peri Strategias that we discussed above, Syrianus put 
significant stock in the role of the commander in maintaining cohesion and effectiveness.95  
Indeed, scholars have also stressed the role of commanders in maintaining cohesion, both in the 
army as a whole as well as in smaller groups,96 in combat.97   
And yet, commanders played a major role in motivation too, which makes this a fitting 
topic with which to conclude.  Fear, discussed several pages earlier, was one such motivational 
tool employed by commanders.  Although the fear implied in the legal compilations is not 
necessarily the same sort of fear mentioned by the historians, there are instances where the 
behaviour of commanders seems to depend on punishing soldiers, often harshly (by execution, 
for instance), for losing weapons.  For instance, while engaged in the siege at Lucca, Narses sent 
Stephanus and some men on ahead to Faventia to find out why some generals had deserted 
(Agathias 1.17.1).  In his short speech, Stephanus rails against the cowardice and dereliction of 
duty on the part of the recalcitrant generals, and he implies that they might suffer significant 
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punishment if they did not act differently (Agathias 1.17.6-7).  In the march to Tricamarum, one 
soldier, a certain Laurus, commits treason and is impaled.  Procopius notes that this case of 
capital punishment frightened the other soldiers considerably (4.1.8), which had the desired 
effect of dissuading others from contemplating treason themselves any time soon. 
Above we noted that the author of the Dialogue of Political Science implies that some 
men would be more likely to keep their position in line than others.98  Indeed, the author argues 
that these men were to be praised, and given appropriate rewards like crowns by their 
commanders.  The role of punishments and rewards in motivating soldiers to perform on the field 
of battle deserves consideration.  It surfaces in the latter half of Procopius’ Wars when the star of 
the central figure in the text, Belisarius, starts to wane.  It is at this point that Procopius provides 
his eulogy of Belisarius, a passage that consciously echoes a comparative episode in the work of 
the great classical historian Thucydides, which is concerned with Pericles.99  During its course, 
Procopius sings the praises of the general, which includes some comments on Belisarius’ 
employment of rewards for both soldiers and civilians.100  Procopius may not provide specific 
examples, but the few types of reward that he gives reveal an interest in combat motivation on 
the part of Belisarius, though some of his practices would seem to contradict the law, at least 
when it comes to those points we highlighted above.  Belisarius rewarded soldiers who had 
received wounds, and so who had presumably not shirked the heat of battle.  He gave bracelets 
and necklaces to those who distinguished themselves, though Procopius does not specify what 
that might have entailed.  On the other hand, Procopius claims that Belisarius would provide 
replacements for those who lost weapons, even horses, in battle.  His actions contrast with those 
of some other sixth century generals including Philippicus, who distributed all manner of awards 
to the wounded and courageous after battle, but after a victory and for remarkable deeds.101  
Indeed, by noting that one man received a Persian horse solely on the basis of performance in 
combat, Theophylact would seem to be rebutting Belisarius’ wanton  replacement of his men’s 
lost horses – in other words, his distribution of a considerable prize in questionable 
circumstances (losing a possession).102   
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As in so many other aspects of life, praise and blame undoubtedly served as major 
motivating tools in sixth-century combat, and it was the commander who was most closely 
connected to this. 
 
Conclusion 
In closing, we have seen that there is plenty of evidence for combat cohesion and 
motivation in the sixth century, even if that evidence does not always provide the sort of detail 
that we might want most.  It should come as no surprise as well to see that Procopius provides a 
significant proportion of this evidence, but that we must go beyond Procopius if we want to build 
as holistic an image of East Rome’s performance in battle as possible.  That means using not just 
the evidence provided by other classicizing historians like Agathias and Theophylact Simocatta, 
but also the legal material, the evidence of the military handbooks, the papyrological material, 
and the even the physical evidence where it is relevant.  The results of this paper are meant to be 
preliminary, and it is hoped that future work will examine the topic in greater detail.103 
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